Hospital Conversions, Margins, And The Provision Of Uncompensated Care
A new nationwide study finds that uncompensated care levels decline when nonprofit hospitals convert to for-profit status.
b y K e n n e t h E . T h o r p e , Cu r t is S . F l o r e n c e , a n d E r i c E . S e i b e r T h e h e a l t h c a r e delivery system went through several key transitions during the 1990s. Two of the most important were ownership consolidation and the rising importance of for-profit systems. These changes have affected nearly every aspect of health care, including health maintenance organizations (HMOs), Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, hospitals, and postacute care institutions. Both trends have raised concerns from patients, providers, and analysts, including concerns about the impact of hospital conversions in general, and for-profit conversions in particular, on provision of care to the uninsured. Not-for-profit hospitals generally are exempt from federal corporate income taxes as charitable organizations as outlined under Section 501c(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Public hospitals have clearly articulated expectations, in part traced to their state and local tax levy support, as safety-net providers. However, for-profit hospitals and systems have a fiduciary obligation to maximize shareholders' wealth. This obligation may run counter to the provision of community benefits, such as care for the uninsured. Therefore, it is important to know whether such care declines when hospitals convert to for-profit entities.
Data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) for 1997 report that uncompensated care accounted for 4.6 percent of expenses in not-for-profit hospitals, 4 percent in for-profit hospitals, and 17.6 percent in major public teaching hospitals. 1 However, these hospitals are not randomly located throughout the country. At issue, therefore, is whether the observed differences in the provision of uncompensated care are related to ownership status and the willingness to provide care, or whether they are caused by other factors such as systematic differences in various markets. Some studies have attempted control for these factors, but they focus only on the role that ownership assumes in the provision of uncompensated care, not on the effect of conversion.
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A few recent studies have examined the level of uncompensated care provided by hospitals converting to for-profit status. 3 To date, these analyses have been limited to work in a single state (Florida) or have relied on data from three states (California, Texas, and Florida) . This work has produced three general results. First, the characteristics (location, number of beds, uncompensated care) of some converting hospitals differ from those of "similar" nonconverting hospitals. This appears to be particularly true among public hospitals converting to for-profit status.
These hospitals had fewer beds and provided less uncompensated care relative to nonconverting public hospitals. Second, at least two studies found that uncompensated care declined among public hospitals converting to for-profit status. Finally, no changes in uncompensated care have been detected among not-for-profit hospitals converting to forprofit status.
Our work extends this earlier literature in three directions. First, our study is nationwide in scope. According to our tabulations, three-quarters of all conversions and 60 percent of nonprofit-to-for-profit conversions since 1990 have occurred outside of Florida, California, and Texas. Second, we explore the full range of hospital conversions among nonprofit, forprofit, and public hospitals. Finally, we examine the impact of hospital conversions on several key performance measures: uncompensated care, hospital operating margins, revenues, expenses, and total adjusted admissions. To our knowledge, our results represent the most comprehensive analysis of hospital conversions to date.
Theoretical Differences
Several models have been advanced to compare the behavior of for-profit and not-forprofit hospitals. 4 For-profit hospitals have a clear claimant to profits generated: the shareholders or owners of the firm. This creates strong incentives for such hospitals to maximize profits. Thus, resources spent in forprofit hospitals to pursue charitable activities, quality maximization, or other activities could conflict with these goals. This is not necessarily the case in not-for-profit and public hospitals, which lack clear claimants on any profits generated. Administrators in these hospitals may pursue other objectives such as maximizing the volume of services, the quality of services, and care for those without health insurance. These models generate testable hypotheses concerning differences in the performance of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public hospitals, including costs, profits (total margins), the volume of admissions, and charitable activities. The traditional theory would suggest that for-profit hospitals have lower costs and higher profits and provide fewer charitable services (such as uncompensated care). Our analysis of hospital conversions examines each of these key measures of hospital performance.
Data And Methods
We analyze changes in uncompensated care, total adjusted admissions, total margin, total revenue, and costs per adjusted admission associated with hospital conversions in community hospitals. Our analysis relies on data derived from the AHA Annual Survey of Hospitals for 1990 Hospitals for -1997 Six different types of conversions were included in our analysis: not-forprofit to for-profit, public to for-profit, forprofit to not-for-profit, public to not-forprofit, not-for-profit to public, and for-profit to public. 6 In several instances, questionable conversion trends were identified for some hospitals. For instance, some hospitals reported two conversions within a three-year period. In these cases, we used a telephone survey of the hospitals in question to check on their actual ownership. The results from our telephone interviews supplement the AHA data in our final data set.
Unfortunately, there is no simple measure of the dollar volume of care that hospitals provide to the uninsured. Instead, our analysis measures hospitals' uncompensated care. Uncompensated care comprises both charity care and bad debt. Conceptually, these components differ. Bad debt represents care provided to individuals where payment is expected but not yet received. Thus, some of this care may be provided to patients with health "Our analysis focuses on uncompensated care as an indicator of care to low-income and uninsured patients."
insurance. Charity care is care provided without the expectation of payment. In practice, hospital accounting systems vary in how they record these items. Moreover, how such care is coded also may be correlated with hospital ownership, making comparisons of the elements of uncompensated care associated with a conversion problematic. Finally, the bulk of the empirical research completed on this topic has focused on the sum of charity care and bad debt. 7 For these collective reasons, our analysis focuses on uncompensated care as an indicator of care to low-income and uninsured patients.
We measured uncompensated care as bad debt and charity care charges deflated by each hospital's cost-to-charge ratio for 1991-1997. To account for variations in hospital capacity and inflation, we divided this measure by total hospital expenses. We also included three other outcome measures that may change with a conversion: total margins, total revenues per adjusted admission, and total costs per adjusted admission. We included these measures to examine how the conversion affected overall hospital performance. Total margin was defined as total revenues minus total costs, divided by total revenues. Our measure of adjusted admissions was developed by the AHA, and the methodology is reported in the Annual Survey of Hospitals.
In addition to hospital conversions, other factors influence the provision of uncompensated care and hospital margins. As a result, we used multivariate techniques to measure the association of conversions with our outcomes of interest. In the uncompensated care regressions, we included controls for the demand for uncompensated care (percentage uninsured in the metropolitan statistical area, and demographic indicators such as the racial and ethnic mix of the local population, unemployment rate, and per capita income). These measures were constructed from the March supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS), an annual survey that reports income, employment, demographic characteristics, and health insurance coverage for the U.S. population. We also included controls for the supply of such care, such as bed size, resident-to-bed ratio, and measures of market competition. 8 Our multivariate analysis uses a fixedeffects regression to control for unobserved hospital characteristics influencing uncompensated care and margins that do not change over time but vary across hospitals. 9 Our unit of observation is each hospital in each year that it operates. We include indicator variables for each type of conversion. The regression coefficients measure the association between type of conversion and dependent variable, relative to hospitals that did not change ownership type. This variable equals 1 for the year the hospital converts and for each year the hospital retains that ownership type. For example, a hospital that converted from not-for-profit to for-profit in 1993 will have the indicator for this type of conversion equal to 1 for 1993-1997. However, if this for-profit hospital converted to public ownership in 1996, the for-profit conversion indicator is 0 for 1996 onward, and the for-profit-to-public indicator becomes 1. Therefore, the coefficients reflect the average change in uncompensated care for all years post conversion.
In some cases, the AHA survey imputes values for hospitals that do not report financial information. Since we used these financial variables as the dependent variables in our regression analysis, it is important to determine the extent to which using imputed values affected our results. To test the sensitivity of our results to imputed values, we estimated a second set of models that excludes all hospitals with all financial information imputed, and we included a variable equal to 1 if the dependent variable is imputed for all remaining observations. The results of this sensitivity analysis are discussed below.
Study Results
n Number and location of conversions. We identified 431 hospital conversions from 1991 through 1997 (Exhibit 1). Of this total, 162 hospitals converted to for-profit status. Of these, 127 converted from not-for-profit to for-profit status. The majority of all conver-sions (252), and slightly fewer than half of for-profit to not-for-profit conversions (66), occurred in the South. The West had the second-highest number of conversions, followed by the Midwest. These two regions had the same number of not-for-profit to for-profit conversions.
n Differences among hospital types. For-profit, not-for-profit, and public hospitals differed in several important dimensions. Exhibit 2 shows the average outcomes for several different hospital characteristics controlling for time, by ownership type.
10 On average, not-for profit hospitals provided more uncompensated care (as a percentage of total expenses) than for-profit hospitals did. Uncompensated care in public hospitals accounted for more than twice the share of total expenses than in for-profit or not-for-profit hospitals. For-profit hospitals had total margins that were double those of not-for-profits and more than three times those of public hospitals. All three hospital types had similar expenses per adjusted admission. However, forprofit hospitals tended to be the smallest. Finally, for-profit hospitals received a larger percentage of their revenue from Medicare than not-for-profit or public hospitals did, while public hospitals received more of their revenue from Medicaid than for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals did.
n Changes in performance among converting hospitals. Although there clearly are differences in the performance of for-profit, not-for-profit, and public hospitals, the results presented in Exhibit 2 do not address how hospital outcomes change after a conversion. We would expect that hospitals that convert from not-for-profit to for-profit status would have lower uncompensated care levels and higher margins than they had previously, for example. We estimated the fixedeffects regression model described above, to determine the effects of conversions on hospital performance. Results derived from our fixed-effects hospital regressions (Exhibit 3) show the change in various hospital performance measures for converting hospitals, compared with the predicted performance of these hospitals if they had not converted.
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These results reveal that uncompensated care provided by not-for-profit hospitals was lower, falling from 5.3 percent to 4.7 percent of total expenses, than it would have been if they had maintained not-for-profit status. The 0.6-percentage-point reduction in uncompensated care amounted, on average, to about $400,000 less spent on such care. 12 A much larger reduction in uncompensated care was observed among public hospitals converting to for-profit status. In this case, uncompensated care accounted for 2.5 percent of total expenses, compared with 5.2 percent if the hospital had not converted. This 2.7-percentage-point reduction in uncompensated care, on average, totaled $800,000, or approximately 150 fewer adjusted admissions per year. 13 Finally, the results indicate that the volume of uncompensated care increased by 2.3 percentage points (from 5.2 percent to 7.5 percent of total expenses) when for-profit hospitals converted to public status. The analysis indicates that the provision of uncompensated care was not significantly affected by other hospital conversions.
n Changes in financial performance. The results reveal that total margins increased by four percentage points when not-for-profit hospitals converted to for-profit status (Exhibit 3). The conversion of for-profit to public ownership was associated with a 9.8-percentage-point reduction in operating margin. Conversion from public to for-profit status was associated with a 2.6-percentagepoint increase in the margin. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that this value is zero. We found no measurable change in total margin among other hospital conversions.
Factors accounting for changes in total margin varied among the types of conversions. Total expenses per adjusted admission were, on average, more than $240 lower when notfor-profit hospitals converted to for-profit status. In contrast, no change in revenues per adjusted admission was associated with these conversions. Finally, both revenue and cost per adjusted admission were lower among for-profit hospitals that converted to public status. However, the reduction in revenues when for-profit hospitals converted to public exceeded the reduction in costs, leading to lower margins.
n Changes in adjusted admissions. We also tracked changes in adjusted admissions among converting hospitals. These trends are particularly important, since our data include several years in which total hospital beds and inpatient admissions were declining. The esti- mated changes in uncompensated care associated with conversion to for-profit status may reflect not only a reduction in uncompensated care but also a broader reduction in admissions and ambulatory care activity. To account for this, we compared changes in total adjusted admissions and uncompensated care-adjusted admissions associated with hospital conversions. We compared these changes to the same types of admissions for hospitals that did not change ownership type (Exhibit 3). Hospitals converting from not-for-profit to forprofit status were associated with 662 fewer adjusted admissions (approximately a 5 percent reduction), compared with not-for-profit hospitals that did not convert. The reduction in total adjusted admissions was only half as large in percentage terms as the reduction in the number of uncompensated care "adjusted admissions." 14 A n even larger reduction (about 10 percent, or 1,060 adjusted admissions) was associated with not-for-profit to public conversions.
Conclusions And Policy Implications
Our study reveals several key changes in health care financing associated with hospitals' conversions. Of particular note is the reduction in uncompensated care associated with the conversion of not-for-profit hospitals to for-profit status-a result not found in prior studies. Several factors could account for the differences, including the national scope of our study, the methodology, and the use of the AHA data. Our results are, however, consistent with earlier findings of a reduction in uncompensated care among public hospitals converting to for-profit status. The results suggest that the transition from not-forprofit to for-profit status was accompanied by an approximately 13 percent reduction in uncompensated care. Such conversions also were accompanied by a four-percentagepoint improvement in operating margin, primarily as a result of lower spending. Even larger reductions in uncompensated care accompanied the transition from public to forprofit status. This is the first empirical study using national data to track changes in hospitals' financial performance and provision of uncompensated care as they change ownership. The results present cause for reflecting on the implications of such changes. On the positive side, the rise in total margins suggests that for-profit converting hospitals appear wellpositioned to meet the increasing demands from all payers to slow the growth in health care spending. Furthermore, hospitals that convert to for-profit status often create charitable foundations from the sale of their nonprofit assets and subsequently pay property, sales, and other taxes. All things considered, it is uncertain whether more or fewer funds flow to a community as a result of an ownership conversion.
Of concern, however, are our findings that the provision of uncompensated care is reduced when hospitals convert to for-profit status. Of particular concern is the large reduction in uncompensated care observed among public to for-profit hospital conversions. Because the bulk of these conversions occurred among smaller, rural public hospitals, such conversions could limit access to hospital care among the uninsured. Current trends indicate a continued rise in the percentage of Americans without health insurance and renewed cost containment pressure on hospitals as a result of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997. When combined with these factors, a continued rise in the number of for-profit hospitals could reduce the willingness or the capacity of hospitals to finance care for those who are unable to pay. NOTES no. 1 (1973) : 87-99, shows that when a hospital's decision making is controlled by physicians who maximize their net income, the not-for-profit hospital will behave like a for-profit firm in the short run. In the end, the differences between not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals are an empirical question. 5. We rely on the same data used in previous work by the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission (now the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission), as well as other published research. See, for example, Mann et al., "A Profile of Uncompensated Hospital Care." The AHA data are unique in their comprehensiveness, although the financial data are not audited. Counts of hospitals reporting information to the AHA, as well as imputations of missing data, are described annually in AHA publications such as Hospital Statistics. In general, approximately 90 percent of all hospitals surveyed respond to the AHA survey. Our analysis of converting and nonconverting hospitals is limited to those included in the survey. The AHA data also may underreport information from for-profit hospitals. For example, approximately three-quarters of all for-profit hospitals responded to the AHA survey. Thus, our analysis undercounts the number of forprofit converting hospitals. Moreover, the external validity of the analysis could be compromised if the characteristics of for-profit hospitals that do and do not report data to the AHA differ. To quantify the magnitude and empirical relevance of any undercount, we compared the AHA survey with Medicare hospital cost report data. We found 369 hospitals included the Medicare cost report data that were not included in the AHA survey data. Of this, 113 (31 percent of all missing hospitals) were for-profit hospitals. However, we found no significant differences in the Medicare data concerning cost per admission, revenues per admission, or total beds among for-profit hospitals that did and did not report information in the AHA survey. While our counts may understate the actual number of for-profit conversions, the external validity of the results does not appear to be compromised. 6. Our analysis included any hospital conversion during the years 1990 through 1997. Of the 431 conversions in our data, approximately 20 percent occurred during 1997. On average, however, converting hospitals in the sample have 3.1 years of preconversion data and 2.3 years of postconversion data. Our regression analysis included several measures of hospital conversion. The analysis reported in the text uses a dummy variable for each type of conversion. This measures the average impact of the conversion on each of our dependent variables. In addition, we estimated other regression specifications to determine if the effect of conversions varies over time.
We included a series of dummy variables for each year post conversion. This allowed us to examine whether the impact of the conversion varied over time post conversion (that is, did the effects vary in the first year of conversion, second year, and so on?). We could not reject the hypothesis that the effect of the conversions on
